Add october meeting

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+  {
+    "date": "2025-10-29",
+    "title": "FOMC Meeting 2025-10-29",
+    "full_text": "FOMC\nMinutes of the\nFederal Open Market Committee\nOctober 28–29, 2025\nFEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market\nCommittee\nOctober 28–29, 2025\nA joint meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee and the Board of Governors of the Federal\nReserve System was held in the offices of the Board of Governors on Tuesday, October 28, 2025, at\n9:00 a.m. and continued on Wednesday, October 29, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.1\nDevelopments in Financial Markets and Open Market Operations\nThe manager turned first to an overview of broad market developments during the intermeeting\nperiod. Market participants left their macroeconomic outlooks little changed, and they appeared to\ncontinue to interpret data made available over the period as consistent with a resilient economy. In\nline with the stable outlook, investors’ expectations for the path of the policy rate, whether market\nbased or survey based, were virtually unchanged over the period. Investors expected a 25 basis point\nlowering in the target range for the federal funds rate at the October meeting and another 25 basis\npoint lowering at the December meeting, although some uncertainty around the December meeting\nwas evident in responses to the Open Market Desk’s Survey of Market Expectations (Desk survey) as\nwell as in market prices. The manager turned next to developments in Treasury markets and market-based measures of\ninflation compensation. Treasury yields were little changed, on net, over the period, consistent with\nstable expectations for the policy rate. Inflation compensation moved lower over the period,\nparticularly for shorter tenors, with staff models attributing these recent movements to temporary\nfactors. Broad equity indexes continued to rise over the period, with the largest technology companies\nperforming strongly on market participants’ optimism about artificial intelligence (AI). The manager\nnoted that rising stock prices were consistent with expectations for continued robust growth in\nearnings. Corporate bond spreads increased a bit this period but remained low in absolute terms. A\ncouple of well-publicized bankruptcies, as well as some credit losses reported by some banks, led to\n1 The Federal Open Market Committee is referenced as the “FOMC” and the “Committee” in these minutes; the Board of\nGovernors of the Federal Reserve System is referenced as the “Board” in these minutes.\n\n2 October 28-29, 2025\nincreased investor scrutiny of credit markets, with investors reportedly closely tracking the riskiest\nsegments of credit markets for signs of weakening and noting the possibility of future losses. Regarding international developments, the manager noted that the trade-weighted dollar index rose\nsomewhat over the period. Despite its recent appreciation, the dollar remained weaker against all\nmajor currencies since the beginning of the year, and outside forecasters continued to expect that the\ndollar would depreciate modestly over the medium term. The manager highlighted that recent changes in money market conditions indicated that the level of\nreserves could be approaching ample. Rates on Treasury repurchase agreements (repo) moved\nnotably higher relative to the interest rate on reserve balances (IORB). Investors attributed this\nmovement to a decline in available liquidity amid ongoing balance sheet runoff and continued large\nTreasury debt issuance. Higher repo rates induced a fairly rapid increase in the effective federal funds\nrate (EFFR) relative to the IORB, with signs that the EFFR might increase further. The manager noted\nthis increase was widespread, with many participants paying higher rates in the federal funds market\nregardless of their reasons for borrowing. Consistent with the move higher in repo rates, the overnight\nreverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility had seen usage fall to de minimis levels. Meanwhile,\nthe standing repo facility (SRF) was used more frequently over the period, albeit not in large volumes. Pressures in money markets resulted in notable movements in some other indicators of reserve\nampleness. For example, payments by banks shifted to later in the day, suggesting that banks may\nhave been economizing on reserves. In addition, the share of domestic banks borrowing in the federal\nfunds market increased. The estimated elasticity of the EFFR with respect to changes in the supply of\nreserves was stable during the period. That outcome, however, was likely due to the aftereffects of\nthe debt ceiling resolution, which likely affected the estimated elasticity. A related concept, the\nelasticity of repo rates to changes in repo volumes, increased significantly since late August. The manager recommended that the Committee consider stopping the runoff of the System Open\nMarket Account (SOMA) portfolio soon. Continuing runoff would imply that volatility in money markets\nlikely would continue to intensify. He noted that excessive money market rate volatility would pose\nrisks to both the control of the policy rate and the stability of funding in the repo market, which in turn\ncould affect the stability of the U.S. Treasury market. The manager also noted that further reductions\nin the size of the portfolio may prove short lived because they would bring forward the time when the\nDesk would need to restart purchases of securities to maintain ample reserves. The manager next discussed the expected trajectory of the balance sheet. Respondents to the Desk\nsurvey had come to expect an earlier date for the end of portfolio runoff. Market outreach suggested\nfurther revisions to expectations in the week after the survey concluded, and the staff estimated that if\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 3\nrespondents had been asked more recently, almost half would have said they expected the Committee\nto announce an end to runoff at this meeting. In the absence of material take-up at the ON RRP facility, and assuming balance sheet runoff would\nend, the staff estimated that reserves would continue to gradually decline amid projected increases in\nother Federal Reserve liabilities. At times, such as during quarter- and year-ends and tax dates,\nreserves were projected to dip to quite low levels. Against this backdrop, the staff would continue to\nmonitor indicators of reserve conditions closely. The manager noted that the Desk would begin using a new trading platform in the near future to\nconduct its repo and reverse repo operations, with other operations to follow in coming quarters. In\naddition, he informed the Committee that there were no intervention operations in foreign currencies\nfor the SOMA during the intermeeting period. By unanimous vote, the Committee ratified the Desk’s domestic transactions over the intermeeting\nperiod. Special Topic: The Standing Repo Facility\nThe staff provided background on the SRF, including potential benefits and costs of central clearing\nfor SRF transactions. The main potential benefit mentioned was greater effectiveness of the SRF in\nhelping to maintain control of the federal funds rate. Central clearing could increase counterparties’\nwillingness to use the SRF when there is upward pressure on repo rates, which would damp pressures\non the federal funds rate. The main potential costs mentioned were increased systemic importance of\nproviders of central clearing, the potential for central clearing of the SRF to enable greater nonbank\nleverage in the Treasury market, and the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s footprint in financial\nmarkets. Most participants commented on the potential for central clearing of SRF transactions.2 Among those\nwho commented, almost all noted that the SRF supports the effective implementation and\ntransmission of monetary policy as well as smooth market functioning, and that central clearing of SRF\ntransactions could improve the effectiveness of the facility. A few participants raised concerns about\nrisks associated with centrally clearing the SRF, including increased systemic importance of providers\nof central clearing. Participants who commented generally supported further study of central clearing\nof SRF transactions.\n2 The discussion summarized here draws from remarks made by participants during various portions of the meeting, as the\nagenda did not include a separate policymaker discussion about the SRF.\n\n4 October 28-29, 2025\nSpecial Topic: Balance Sheet Issues\nThe FOMC’s “Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet,” announced in May\n2022, indicated that the Committee intended to cease balance sheet runoff when reserve balances\nare judged to be somewhat above a level consistent with ample reserves. Since then, the size of the\nFederal Reserve’s balance sheet had declined substantially. In addition, money market conditions\nhad tightened recently, which suggested that reserve balances may be moving closer to ample. In\nlight of these developments, participants discussed whether to stop balance sheet runoff soon and\nwhat the maturity composition of the SOMA Treasury portfolio (SOMA portfolio) should be in the longer\nrun. Views on the latter would guide the investment of principal payments received on the Federal\nReserve’s holdings of agency securities as well as the composition of securities to be purchased once\nreserve management purchases would be needed. Consequently, participants agreed that their\ndiscussions at this meeting would help inform the Committee’s future decisions regarding the long-run\ncomposition of the SOMA portfolio. The participants’ discussion was preceded by a staff presentation. The staff reviewed the composition\nof the SOMA portfolio and provided some considerations regarding the SOMA portfolio’s long-run\ncomposition, including issues related to market functioning, potential macroeconomic implications,\ninteractions with the Treasury’s management of the federal debt, monetary policy implementation,\nand the Federal Reserve’s net income. The presentation noted that the current share of Treasury bills\nin the SOMA portfolio was smaller than the bill share of total Treasury securities outstanding. The\nstaff also noted that if the Committee preferred a SOMA portfolio with a proportional or greater share\nof Treasury bills relative to total outstanding, policymakers could wait to make that decision because\nthe current share of Treasury bills in the portfolio was small and the monthly amounts of principal\npayments received on the Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency securities that would need to be\nreinvested once balance sheet runoff stopped were modest. Participants agreed that the recent tightening in money market conditions indicated that it would soon\nbe appropriate to end balance sheet runoff and that reinvestments of principal payments received on\nagency securities holdings should be directed into Treasury bills. Various participants highlighted the\nneed to continue to monitor money market conditions. Participants also agreed that a larger share of\nTreasury bills than the current portfolio allocation would be desirable in the long run. A larger share of\nTreasury bills would shift the SOMA portfolio composition toward that of Treasury securities\noutstanding. Many participants indicated that a greater share of Treasury bills could provide the\nFederal Reserve with more flexibility to accommodate changes in the demand for reserves or changes\nin nonreserve liabilities and thereby help to maintain an ample level of reserves. Several participants\nalso noted that a greater share of Treasury bills could increase flexibility for future monetary policy\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 5\naccommodation without having to raise the level of reserves. The majority of participants indicated\nthat a larger share of Treasury bills would also reduce Federal Reserve income volatility. Some participants indicated that during a transition phase, purchases to reach a larger share of\nTreasury bills in the SOMA portfolio could reduce the availability of short-term Treasury securities to\nthe private sector and potentially affect market functioning. They thus favored a measured approach\nto purchasing Treasury bills. A couple of other participants noted the absence of market functioning\nproblems in past episodes when purchases focused on Treasury bills. A number of participants noted\nthat the expected pace of paydowns of agency securities in the near term was around only $15 billion\nto $20 billion per month, and that redirecting these proceeds into Treasury bills once balance sheet\nrunoff ended likely would not adversely affect market functioning. Overall, most participants favored a long-run composition of the SOMA portfolio that matched the\ncomposition of Treasury securities outstanding, indicating that a proportional allocation would provide\nenough flexibility and may be simpler to communicate. Some participants indicated that they favored\na larger-than-proportional share of Treasury bills, citing the benefits of having even greater flexibility\nthan available under a proportional allocation. Various participants noted that it was not necessary to\ndecide on the long-run composition of the SOMA portfolio at this time, as the shift toward a long-run\ncomposition would take place over a number of years. Staff Review of the Economic Situation\nThe information available at the time of the meeting indicated that growth of real gross domestic\nproduct (GDP) had moderated over the first half of the year. Information on the labor market was\nlimited by the federal government shutdown; however, available indicators were consistent with a\ncontinued gradual cooling in the labor market without any evidence of a sharp deterioration. Consumer price inflation had moved up since earlier in the year and remained somewhat elevated. Total consumer price inflation—as measured by the 12--month change in the price index for personal\nconsumption expenditures (PCE)—was estimated to have been 2.8 percent in September based on\ndata from the consumer price index. Core PCE price inflation, which excludes changes in consumer\nenergy prices and many consumer food prices, was also estimated to have been 2.8 percent in\nSeptember. These estimates implied that total PCE price inflation had risen 0.5 percentage point\nrelative to a year ago and that core PCE inflation was unchanged from its year-earlier rate. Real GDP posted a strong gain in the second quarter following a decline in the first quarter, although\nthe average increase over the first half of the year was slower than the average pace seen over 2024. Real private domestic final purchases (PDFP)—which comprises PCE and private fixed investment and\nwhich often provides a better signal of underlying economic momentum than GDP—had risen faster\n\n6 October 28-29, 2025\nthan GDP over the first half but had also slowed relative to its 2024 rate of increase. PDFP growth\nappeared to have continued at a solid pace in the third quarter, though the government shutdown had\nreduced the amount of data that was available to gauge third-quarter economic activity. Available\ndata suggested that net exports positively contributed to GDP growth in the third quarter. After falling\nsharply in the second quarter and then rising somewhat in July, real imports of goods appeared to\nhave resumed falling in August. U.S. real goods exports appeared to have declined moderately in\nAugust after having increased modestly in the first half of the year. The government shutdown was\nexpected to reduce GDP growth for as long as it continued, with a corresponding boost to growth once\nthe government reopened and government production and purchases returned to normal levels. Recent activity indicators suggested that foreign real GDP growth slowed in the third quarter relative to\nthe first half of the year. Growth in China softened amid fading fiscal stimulus and a persistent\nproperty-sector downturn, while indicators in Europe continued to point to subdued activity. Slower\nforeign growth was driven in part by weaker exports due to reduced U.S. demand and lower\ninvestment due to elevated uncertainty, likely reflecting the effects of the U.S. tariffs. Growth in some\nforeign economies, especially in Mexico and parts of Asia, was supported by continued strong demand\nfor high-tech products, originating primarily from the U.S. Headline inflation was near central banks’ targets in many foreign economies, aided by declines in\nglobal energy prices. However, core inflation remained elevated in some economies, notably Brazil,\nMexico, and the U.K. By contrast, inflation in China continued to be subdued. In response to\nlackluster economic activity, some foreign central banks—including the Bank of Canada, the Sveriges\nRiksbank, and the Bank of Mexico—cut their policy rates further over the intermeeting period. Staff Review of the Financial Situation\nOver the intermeeting period, both the market-implied expected path of the federal funds rate through\nthe end of 2026 and nominal Treasury yields were little changed on net. At short maturities, real\nyields rose somewhat as measures of inflation compensation decreased amid declines in oil prices. At\nlonger maturities, real yields and inflation compensation were little changed on net. Broad equity price indexes increased moderately, boosted by technology firms with positive earnings\nnews and AI-related investor optimism. Credit spreads were little changed, on net, and remained very\nlow by historical standards. The one-month option-implied volatility on the S&P 500 index was largely\nunchanged, on net, and remained near the median of its historical distribution. Risk appetite in foreign financial markets was generally strong. On net, foreign equity indexes were\nmoderately higher, and technology stocks outperformed in several economies, largely reflecting\ncontinued investor optimism regarding AI. Market-based policy expectations and longer-term yields\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 7\ndeclined in most major advanced foreign economies, in part because of weak economic data. By\ncontrast, yields in Japan rose amid political developments that led to expectations for increased fiscal\nspending. The broad dollar index increased modestly, primarily driven by the relative strength of U.S.\neconomic data. Conditions in U.S. short-term funding markets tightened materially over the intermeeting period but\nremained orderly. Late in the period, the spread between the EFFR and the IORB reached the\nnarrowest level since the runoff of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet began in 2022. The Secured\nOvernight Financing Rate occasionally printed above the minimum bid rate at the SRF, and SRF takeup occurred on several days. The average usage of the ON RRP facility fell to its lowest level since\n2021. Taken together, these developments suggested that reserve balances were moving closer to\nample levels. In domestic credit markets, borrowing costs of businesses, households, and municipalities remained\nsignificantly lower than the highs observed in 2023 but elevated relative to their average post–Global\nFinancial Crisis levels. Yields on corporate bonds and leveraged loans edged down. Rates on 30-year\nfixed-rate conforming residential mortgages were little changed on net. Yields on commercial\nmortgage-backed securities (CMBS) moved up modestly. Interest rates on credit card accounts edged\nup a touch in August. Credit remained generally available but relatively tight for small businesses. Issuance of corporate\nbonds, leveraged loans, and private credit was robust in recent months. Core loans on banks’ books\ncontinued to increase in the third quarter, driven primarily by strong growth in commercial and\nindustrial (C&I) lending. In the residential mortgage market, credit remained easily available for highcredit-score borrowers but less so for low-score borrowers. Consumer credit remained generally\navailable for most households. Banks in the October Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices reported, on net,\nan easing in bank lending conditions on C&I loans for large firms and those with low exposures to\ninternational trade. Banks also eased standards for commercial real estate loans, credit cards, and\nauto loans over the third quarter. The overall level of bank lending standards aggregated across all\nloan categories was estimated to be around the median level observed since 2011. Credit quality was generally stable at levels somewhat weaker than during the pre-pandemic period. The credit performance of corporate bonds, leveraged loans, and private credit remained stable. The\nuse of distressed exchanges among leveraged loan borrowers and payment-in-kind interest among\nprivate credit borrowers, however, remained elevated. Delinquency rates on small business loans\ncontinued to be moderately above pre-pandemic levels, and those on CMBS remained elevated\nthrough September. Delinquency rates on most mortgage loan types, by contrast, stayed near\n\n8 October 28-29, 2025\nhistorical lows. Credit card delinquency rates inched down in September, while auto loan delinquency\nrates ticked up, and both rates stood above their pre-pandemic levels. The staff provided an updated assessment of the stability of the U.S. financial system and, on balance,\ncontinued to characterize the system’s financial vulnerabilities as notable. The staff judged that asset\nvaluation pressures were elevated. For public equities, price-to-earnings ratios stood at the upper end\nof their historical distribution. Nonprice indicators, such as the number of newly launched leveraged\nexchanged-traded products, also reflected high and broad-based investor demand for risky assets. Vulnerabilities associated with nonfinancial business and household debt were characterized as\nmoderate. Corporate debt grew modestly over the past few years, and household balance sheets\nremained strong. The rapid growth of private credit moderated somewhat, but recent bankruptcies\nraised concerns about credit quality and hidden leverage in this market. House prices remained high\nbut flattened out in the past year, and the likelihood of severe distress among mortgage borrowers\nappeared to be notably lower than following the previous period of elevated house prices, in part\nbecause of stronger underwriting standards and near historical highs for homeowners’ equity. Vulnerabilities associated with leverage in the financial sector were characterized as notable. Hedge\nfund leverage, on average, remained elevated and increased further, driven by both a shift toward\nmore leveraged strategies and an increase in leverage within strategies. Available data suggested\nthat hedge fund exposure to Treasury markets doubled over the past two years. By contrast, banks\nremained resilient, with high regulatory capital ratios and improved funding structure, although their\nmarket-adjusted capital ratios remained depressed and sensitive to long-term interest rates. Vulnerabilities associated with funding risks were characterized as moderate. The amount of total\nshort-run funding instruments and cash management vehicles as a fraction of GDP grew in recent\nyears but remained in the middle of its historical range. The total market capitalization of stablecoins,\nsome of which may be vulnerable to runs, grew significantly in the past two years. Staff Economic Outlook\nRelative to the forecast prepared for the September meeting, real GDP growth was projected to be\nmodestly stronger, on balance, through 2028, reflecting stronger expected potential output growth\nand greater projected support from financial conditions. GDP growth after 2025 was expected to\nremain above potential until 2028 as the drag from higher tariffs waned, with financial conditions\nbecoming a tailwind for spending. As a result, the unemployment rate was expected to decline\ngradually after this year before flattening out at a level slightly below the staff’s estimate of the natural\nrate of unemployment.\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 9\nThe staff’s inflation forecast was broadly similar to the one prepared for the September meeting, with\ntariff increases expected to put upward pressure on inflation in 2025 and 2026. Thereafter, inflation\nwas projected to return to its previous disinflationary trend. The staff continued to view the uncertainty around the forecast as elevated, citing a cooling labor\nmarket, still-elevated inflation, heightened uncertainty about government policy changes and their\neffects on the economy, and the limited availability of data caused by the government shutdown. Risks around the employment and GDP forecasts continued to be seen as skewed to the downside, as\nelevated economic uncertainty and a cooling labor market raised the risk of a sharper-than-expected\nweakening in labor market conditions and output growth. Risks around the inflation forecast\ncontinued to be seen as skewed to the upside, as the elevated levels of some measures of expected\ninflation and more than four consecutive years of actual inflation above 2 percent raised the\npossibility that this year’s projected rise in inflation would prove to be more persistent than the staff\nanticipated. Participants’ Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook\nIn their discussion of inflation, participants observed that overall inflation had moved up since earlier\nin the year and remained somewhat above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal. Participants\ngenerally noted that core inflation had remained elevated, as disinflation in housing services had been\nmore than offset by higher goods inflation, reflecting in part the effects of tariff increases implemented\nearlier in the year. Several participants observed that, setting aside their estimates of tariff effects,\ninflation was close to the Committee’s target. Many participants, however, remarked that overall\ninflation had been above target for some time and had shown little sign of returning sustainably to the\n2 percent objective in a timely manner. Participants generally expected inflation to remain somewhat elevated in the near term before moving\ngradually to 2 percent. Several participants pointed to the persistence in core nonhousing services\ninflation as a factor that may keep overall inflation above 2 percent in the near term. Many\nparticipants expected some additional pickup in core goods inflation over the next few quarters, driven\nin part by further pass-through of tariffs to firms’ pricing. Several participants expressed uncertainty\nabout the timing and magnitude of tariff-related price effects, noting that some businesses were\nreportedly waiting to adjust prices until tariff policies seemed more settled. Drawing on reports from\ntheir District contacts, several participants remarked that businesses, including those not directly\naffected by tariffs, indicated that they planned to raise prices gradually in response to higher tariffrelated input costs. A few participants suggested that potential recent productivity gains achieved\nthrough automation and AI may help businesses support their profit margins and limit the extent to\nwhich cost increases are passed on to consumers. A few participants commented that the softer labor\n\n10 October 28-29, 2025\nmarket would likely help keep inflationary pressures in check. A couple of participants noted that\nrecent changes in immigration policies would lessen housing demand and strengthen the disinflation\nin housing services prices. Participants generally noted that most measures of short-term inflation expectations had eased\nsomewhat from their peaks earlier in the year and that most survey-based and market-based\nmeasures of longer-term inflation have shown little net change since the end of last year, which\nsuggested that longer-term inflation expectations remained well anchored. Participants emphasized\nthe importance of maintaining well-anchored inflation expectations to help return inflation to the\nCommittee’s 2 percent objective in a timely manner, and many noted concerns that the prolonged\nperiod of above-target inflation could risk an increase in longer-term expectations. With regard to the labor market, participants observed that the data available before the government\nshutdown indicated that job gains had slowed this year and that the unemployment rate had edged up\nbut remained low through August. Participants commented on the lack of the Employment Situation\nreport for September during this intermeeting period and reported relying on private-sector and limited\ngovernment data, as well as information provided by businesses and community contacts, to assess\nlabor market conditions. Participants pointed to recent available indicators, including survey-based\nmeasures of job availability, as being consistent with layoffs and hiring having remained low as well as\na labor market that had gradually softened through September and October but had not sharply\ndeteriorated. Participants generally attributed the slowdown in job creation to both reduced labor\nsupply—stemming from lower immigration and labor force participation—and less labor demand amid\nmoderate economic growth and elevated uncertainty. Many participants remarked that structural\nfactors such as investment related to AI and other productivity-enhancing technologies may be\ncontributing to softer labor demand. Regarding the outlook for the labor market, participants generally expected conditions to soften\ngradually in coming months and the labor market to remain less dynamic than earlier in the year, with\nbusinesses reluctant to add workers but also hesitant to lay off employees. Several participants\ndescribed the lack of job turnover and hesitancy among businesses to add jobs as adding downside\nrisks to the labor market, noting that a further weakening in labor demand could push the\nunemployment rate sharply higher. A few participants viewed the rise in the unemployment rates for\ngroups historically more sensitive to cyclical changes in economic activity, or the concentration of job\ngains in less-cyclical sectors, as signaling potential broader labor market weakness. Some\nparticipants noted the apparent divergence between subdued job growth and moderate GDP growth,\nwith several suggesting that this pattern might persist over time as advances in AI boost productivity\ngrowth while demographic factors constrain labor supply.\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 11\nParticipants noted that available indicators suggested that economic activity appeared to have been\nexpanding at a moderate pace, although a number of participants observed that the lack of\ngovernment-provided spending data since the shutdown made it challenging to gauge the more recent\nstrength of overall activity. Participants generally noted that consumer spending had shown signs of\nfirming in recent months after the slowdown observed early in the year. Many participants, however,\nremarked on a divergence in spending patterns across income groups, noting that consumption\ngrowth appeared to be disproportionately supported by higher-income households benefiting from\nstrong equity markets, while lower-income households demonstrated increased price sensitivity and\nspending adjustments in response to high prices and elevated economic uncertainty. A couple of\nparticipants expressed concern about the relatively narrow base of support for consumption growth,\nnoting the potential vulnerability should high-income consumer spending weaken. A couple of\nparticipants mentioned continued weakness in the housing market, despite some recent signs of\nstabilization, and that housing-affordability challenges remained a significant constraint on the sector. Regarding the business sector, many participants highlighted strong investment in technology,\nparticularly spending related to AI and data centers. Some participants suggested that those\ninvestments could boost productivity and thus aggregate supply. A few participants noted that lower\nbusiness taxes or further expected easing in government regulations would likely support business\nactivity and productivity growth over time. Some participants remarked that financial conditions were\nsupportive of economic activity. A few participants mentioned the persistent headwinds facing the\nagricultural sector from compressed profit margins due to low crop prices, elevated input costs, and\nretrenched demand from abroad. Participants generally judged that uncertainty about the economic outlook remained elevated. Participants saw risks to both sides of the Committee’s dual mandate, with many indicating that\ndownside risks to employment had increased since earlier in the year, as the unemployment rate\nticked up and the pace of job gains slowed, leaving the labor market more susceptible to any negative\nshock. Many participants continued to see upside risks to their inflation outlook, pointing to the\npossibility that elevated inflation could prove more persistent than currently expected even after the\neffects of this year’s tariff increases fade. A few participants remarked on the risk that trade tensions\ncould disrupt global supply chains and weigh on overall economic activity. Many participants observed\nthat the divergence between solid economic growth and weak job creation created a particularly\nchallenging environment for policy decisions, requiring careful monitoring of incoming data to\ndistinguish between cyclical weakness and structural changes in the relationship between output and\nemployment. When discussing uncertainty, various participants expressed concern about the\npotential effect of a prolonged government shutdown, both on near-term economic activity and on the\nability to accurately assess economic conditions because of limitations to the availability of federal\n\n12 October 28-29, 2025\ngovernment data. Several participants, however, remarked that other private and public indicators, as\nwell as information in the Beige Book and obtained from District contacts, continued to provide useful\nsignals about economic conditions. In their discussion of financial stability, a number of participants pointed to some recent failures of\nfirms involved in nonbank credit activity. These participants suggested that there were various\nreasons for concern about developments in the private credit sector, which included risks related to\nloan quality, the sector’s funding practices, poor underwriting and collateral practices, banks’\nexposure to the sector, and the possibility of the transmission of strains in the sector to the real\neconomy. A few participants noted that recent years’ growth in private credit was an example of\ntraditional financial activity moving outside the existing U.S. regulatory framework. Some participants\ncommented on stretched asset valuations in financial markets, with several of these participants\nhighlighting the possibility of a disorderly fall in equity prices, especially in the event of an abrupt\nreassessment of the possibilities of AI-related technology. A couple of participants cited risks\nassociated with high levels of corporate borrowing. In their consideration of monetary policy at this meeting, participants noted that inflation had moved\nup since earlier in the year and remained somewhat elevated. Participants further noted that\navailable indicators suggested that economic activity had been expanding at a moderate pace. They\nobserved that job gains had slowed this year and that the unemployment rate had edged up but\nremained low through August. Participants assessed that more recent indicators were consistent with\nthese developments. In addition, they judged that downside risks to employment had risen in recent\nmonths. Against this backdrop, many participants were in favor of lowering the target range for the\nfederal funds rate at this meeting, some supported such a decision but could have also supported\nmaintaining the level of the target range, and several were against lowering the target range. Those\nwho favored or could have supported a lowering of the target range for the federal funds rate toward a\nmore neutral setting generally observed that such a decision was appropriate because downside risks\nto employment had increased in recent months and upside risks to inflation had diminished since\nearlier this year or were little changed. Those who preferred to keep the target range for the federal\nfunds rate unchanged at this meeting expressed concern that progress toward the Committee’s\ninflation objective had stalled this year, as inflation readings increased, or that more confidence was\nneeded that inflation was on a course toward the Committee’s 2 percent objective, while also noting\nthat longer-term inflation expectations could rise should inflation not return to 2 percent in a timely\nmanner. One participant agreed with the need to move toward a more neutral monetary policy stance\nbut preferred a ½ percentage point reduction at this meeting. In light of their assessment that reserve\nbalances had reached or were approaching ample levels, almost all participants noted that it was\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 13\nappropriate to conclude the reduction in the Committee’s aggregate securities holdings on December\n1 or that they could support such a decision. In considering the outlook for monetary policy, participants expressed a range of views about the\ndegree to which the current stance of monetary policy was restrictive. Some participants assessed\nthat the Committee’s policy stance would be restrictive even after a potential ¼ percentage point\nreduction in the policy rate at this meeting. By contrast, some participants pointed to the resilience of\neconomic activity, supportive financial conditions, or estimates of short-term real interest rates as\nindicating that the stance of monetary policy was not clearly restrictive. In discussing the near-term\ncourse of monetary policy, participants expressed strongly differing views about what policy decision\nwould most likely be appropriate at the Committee’s December meeting. Most participants judged\nthat further downward adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate would likely be\nappropriate as the Committee moved to a more neutral policy stance over time, although several of\nthese participants indicated that they did not necessarily view another 25 basis point reduction as\nlikely to be appropriate at the December meeting. Several participants assessed that a further\nlowering of the target range for the federal funds rate could well be appropriate in December if the\neconomy evolved about as they expected over the coming intermeeting period. Many participants\nsuggested that, under their economic outlooks, it would likely be appropriate to keep the target range\nunchanged for the rest of the year. All participants agreed that monetary policy was not on a preset\ncourse and would be informed by a wide range of incoming data, the evolving economic outlook, and\nthe balance of risks. In discussing risk-management considerations that could bear on the outlook for monetary policy,\nparticipants generally judged that upside risks to inflation remained elevated and that downside risks\nto employment were elevated and had increased since the first half of the year. Many participants\nagreed that the Committee should be deliberate in its policy decisions against the backdrop of these\ntwo-sided risks and reduced availability of key economic data. Most participants suggested that, in\nmoving to a more neutral policy stance, the Committee was helping forestall the possibility of a major\ndeterioration in labor market conditions. Many of these participants also judged that, with more\nevidence having accumulated that the effect on overall inflation of this year’s higher tariffs would likely\nbe limited, it was appropriate for the Committee to ease its policy stance in response to downside\nrisks to employment. Most participants noted that, against a backdrop of elevated inflation readings\nand a very gradual cooling of labor market conditions, further policy rate reductions could add to the\nrisk of higher inflation becoming entrenched or could be misinterpreted as implying a lack of\npolicymaker commitment to the 2 percent inflation objective. Participants judged that a careful\nbalancing of risks was required and agreed on the importance of well-anchored longer-term inflation\nexpectations in achieving the Committee’s dual-mandate objectives.\n\n14 October 28-29, 2025\nCommittee Policy Actions\nIn their discussions of monetary policy for this meeting, members agreed that available indicators\nsuggested that economic activity had been expanding at a moderate pace. They also agreed that job\ngains had slowed this year and that the unemployment rate had edged up but remained low through\nAugust. Members observed that more recent indicators were consistent with these developments. They noted that inflation had moved up since earlier in the year and remained somewhat elevated. They agreed that the Committee was attentive to the risks to both sides of its dual mandate and that\ndownside risks to employment had risen in recent months. In support of the Committee’s goals and in light of the shift in the balance of risks, almost all members\ndecided to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by ¼ percentage point to 3¾ to 4 percent. Two members voted against that decision. One of these members preferred to lower the target range\n½ percentage point, while the other member preferred to leave the target range unchanged. Almost\nall members agreed to conclude the reduction of the Committee’s securities holdings on December 1. One member who voted against the Committee’s policy rate decision at the meeting also preferred an\nimmediate end to balance sheet runoff. Members agreed that, in considering additional adjustments\nto the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee would carefully assess incoming data, the\nevolving outlook, and the balance of risks. All members agreed that the postmeeting statement\nshould affirm their strong commitment both to supporting maximum employment and to returning\ninflation to the Committee’s 2 percent objective. Members agreed that, in assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee would\ncontinue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. They would be\nprepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy if risks emerged that could impede the attainment of\nthe Committee’s goals. Members also agreed that their assessments would take into account a wide\nrange of information, including readings on labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation\nexpectations, and financial and international developments. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee voted to direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New\nYork, until instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the SOMA in accordance with the following\ndomestic policy directive, for release at 2:00 p.m.:\n“Effective October 30, 2025, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to:\n• Undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a\ntarget range of 3¾ to 4 percent.\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 15\n• Conduct standing overnight repurchase agreement operations with a minimum bid rate of\n4.0 percent and with an aggregate operation limit of $500 billion.\n• Conduct standing overnight reverse repurchase agreement operations at an offering rate\nof 3.75 percent and with a per-counterparty limit of $160 billion per day.\n• Roll over at auction the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s\nholdings of Treasury securities maturing in October and November that exceeds a cap of\n$5 billion per month. Redeem Treasury coupon securities up to this monthly cap and\nTreasury bills to the extent that coupon principal payments are less than the monthly cap. Beginning on December 1, roll over at auction all principal payments from the Federal\nReserve’s holdings of Treasury securities.\n• Reinvest the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of\nagency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) received in October and\nNovember that exceeds a cap of $35 billion per month into Treasury securities to roughly\nmatch the maturity composition of Treasury securities outstanding. Beginning on\nDecember 1, reinvest all principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of\nagency securities into Treasury bills.\n• Allow modest deviations from stated amounts for reinvestments, if needed for\noperational reasons.”\nThe vote also encompassed approval of the statement below for release at 2:00 p.m.:\n“Available indicators suggest that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace. Job gains have slowed this year, and the unemployment rate has edged up but remained low\nthrough August; more recent indicators are consistent with these developments. Inflation has\nmoved up since earlier in the year and remains somewhat elevated. The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent\nover the longer run. Uncertainty about the economic outlook remains elevated. The\nCommittee is attentive to the risks to both sides of its dual mandate and judges that\ndownside risks to employment rose in recent months. In support of its goals and in light of the shift in the balance of risks, the Committee decided\nto lower the target range for the federal funds rate by ¼ percentage point to 3¾ to 4 percent. In considering additional adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the\nCommittee will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks. The Committee decided to conclude the reduction of its aggregate securities holdings on\n\n16 October 28-29, 2025\nDecember 1. The Committee is strongly committed to supporting maximum employment and\nreturning inflation to its 2 percent objective. In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to\nmonitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee\nwould be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that\ncould impede the attainment of the Committee’s goals. The Committee’s assessments will\ntake into account a wide range of information, including readings on labor market conditions,\ninflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments.”\nVoting for this action: Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle\nW. Bowman; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Austan D. Goolsbee; Philip N. Jefferson; Alberto G. Musalem; and Christopher J. Waller. Voting against this action: Stephen I. Miran, who preferred to lower the target range for the federal\nfunds rate by ½ percentage point at this meeting, and Jeffrey R. Schmid, who preferred no change to\nthe target range for the federal funds rate at this meeting. Consistent with the Committee’s decision to lower the target range for the federal funds rate to 3¾ to\n4 percent, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to lower the\ninterest rate paid on reserve balances to 3.90 percent, effective October 30, 2025. The Board of\nGovernors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to approve a ¼ percentage point\ndecrease in the primary credit rate to 4.0 percent, effective October 30, 2025.3\nIt was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee would be held on Tuesday–Wednesday,\nDecember 9–10, 2025. The meeting adjourned at 10:20 a.m. on October 29, 2025. Notation Vote\nBy notation vote completed on October 7, 2025, the Committee unanimously approved the minutes of\nthe Committee meeting held on September 16–17, 2025. Attendance\nJerome H. Powell, Chair\n3 In taking this action, the Board approved requests to establish that rate submitted by the Board of Directors of the Federal\nReserve Banks of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco. The vote also\nencompassed approval by the Board of Governors of the establishment of a 4.0 percent primary credit rate by the remaining\nFederal Reserve Banks, effective on October 30, 2025, or the date such Reserve Banks inform the Secretary of the Board of\nsuch a request. (Secretary’s note: Subsequently, the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland, St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Kansas\nCity were informed of the Board’s approval of their establishment of a primary credit rate of 4.0 percent, effective October 30,\n2025.)\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 17\nJohn C. Williams, Vice Chair\nMichael S. Barr\nMichelle W. Bowman\nSusan M. Collins\nLisa D. Cook\nAustan D. Goolsbee\nPhilip N. Jefferson\nStephen I. Miran\nAlberto G. Musalem\nJeffrey R. Schmid\nChristopher J. Waller\nBeth M. Hammack, Neel Kashkari, Lorie K. Logan, Anna Paulson, and Sushmita Shukla, Alternate\nMembers of the Committee\nThomas I. Barkin, Raphael W. Bostic, and Mary C. Daly, Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of\nRichmond, Atlanta, and San Francisco, respectively\nJoshua Gallin, Secretary\nMatthew M. Luecke, Deputy Secretary\nBrian J. Bonis, Assistant Secretary\nMichelle A. Smith, Assistant Secretary\nMark E. Van Der Weide, General Counsel\nRichard Ostrander, Deputy General Counsel\nTrevor A. Reeve, Economist\nStacey Tevlin, Economist\nBeth Anne Wilson, Economist\nBrian M. Doyle, Carlos Garriga, Joseph W. Gruber, and William Wascher, Associate Economists\nRoberto Perli, Manager, System Open Market Account\nJulie Ann Remache, Deputy Manager, System Open Market Account\nDaniel Aaronson, Interim Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago\nStephanie R. Aaronson, Senior Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board\nJose Acosta, Senior System Engineer II, Division of Information Technology, Board\nRoc Armenter, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia\nAlyssa Arute,4 Assistant Director, Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems, Board\nAlessandro Barbarino, Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nJulia Barmeier,4 Lead Financial Institution Policy Analyst, Division of Reserve Bank Operations and\nPayment Systems, Board\nWilliam F. Bassett, Senior Associate Director, Division of Financial Stability, Board\nJose Berrospide, Assistant Director, Division of Financial Stability, Board\nPaola Boel, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland\nErik Bostrom,4 Senior Financial Institution Policy Analyst I, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\n4 Attended through the discussion of balance sheet issues.\n\n18 October 28-29, 2025\nDavid Bowman,4 Senior Associate Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nNina Boyarchenko, Financial Research Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nFalk Braeuning, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston\nChristian V. Cabanilla,4 Policy Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nMichele Cavallo, Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nKathryn B. Chen,4 Director of Cross Portfolio Policy and Analysis, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nAndrew Cohen,5 Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nStephanie E. Curcuru, Deputy Director, Division of International Finance, Board\nMarnie Gillis DeBoer,6 Senior Associate Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nAnthony M. Diercks, Principal Economist, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nCynthia L. Doniger,4 Principal Economist, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nBurcu Duygan-Bump, Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board\nGiovanni Favara, Deputy Associate Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nLaura J. Feiveson,7 Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nErin E. Ferris,4 Principal Economist, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nAndrew Figura, Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board\nAaron Flaaen, Principal Economist, Division of International Finance, Board\nGlenn Follette, Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board\nGreg Frischmann, Senior Special Counsel, Legal Division, Board; Special Adviser to the Board, Division\nof Board Members, Board\nJamie Grasing,4 Senior Data Engineer, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nBrian Greene,4 Associate Director, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nJames Hebden, Principal Economic Modeler, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nValerie S. Hinojosa, Section Chief, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nMatteo Iacoviello, Senior Associate Director, Division of International Finance, Board\nJane E. Ihrig, Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nSebastian Infante,4 Section Chief, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nBenjamin K. Johannsen, Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nCallum Jones, Principal Economist, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nMichael T. Kiley, Deputy Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\n5 Attended the discussion of economic developments and the outlook.\n6 Attended through the discussion of developments in financial markets and open market operations.\n7 Attended through the discussion of balance sheet issues, and from the discussion of current monetary policy through the end\nof the meeting.\n\nMinutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 19\nElizabeth Klee, Deputy Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nMichael Koslow,4 Associate Director, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nAnna R. Kovner, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond\nSeung Kwak, Senior Economist, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nBritt Leckman,8 Federal Reserve Board Staff Photographer, Division of Board Members, Board\nAndreas Lehnert, Director, Division of Financial Stability, Board\nEric B. Lewin,4 Assistant General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nKurt F. Lewis, Special Adviser to the Chair, Division of Board Members, Board\nLaura Lipscomb, Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nByron Lutz, Deputy Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board\nDina Tavares Marchioni,9 Director of Money Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nBenjamin W. McDonough, Deputy Secretary and Ombudsman, Office of the Secretary, Board\nAlisdair G. McKay, Monetary Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis\nKindra I. Morelock, Information Services Senior Analyst, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board, and\nFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago\nNorman J. Morin, Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board\nDavid Na,4 Acting Group Manager, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nEdward Nelson, Senior Adviser, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nAnna Nordstrom, Head of Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nCaterina Petrucco-Littleton,10 Deputy Associate Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs,\nBoard; Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nBrian Phillips,5 Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nEugenio P. Pinto,7 Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nChristine Repper,11 Manager, Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems, Board\nWilliam E. Riordan,4 Capital Markets Trading Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of New York\nSamuel Schulhofer-Wohl, Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas\nKirk Schwarzbach, Special Assistant to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nZeynep Senyuz, Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nJohn J. Stevens, Senior Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board\nMary H. Tian,4 Group Manager, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nPaula Tkac, Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta\n8 Attended opening remarks for Tuesday’s session only.\n9 Attended through the discussion of economic developments and the outlook.\n10 Attended Wednesday’s session only.\n11 Attended Tuesday’s session only.\n\n20 October 28-29, 2025\nAnnette Vissing-Jørgensen, Senior Adviser, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board\nJeffrey D. Walker,4 Senior Associate Director, Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment\nSystems, Board\nEric Wallerstein, Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\nDaniel Wilson, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco\nEvan Winerman,4 Deputy Associate General Counsel, Legal Division, Board\nEmre Yoldas, Deputy Associate Director, Division of International Finance, Board\nFilip Zikes, Special Adviser to the Board, Division of Board Members, Board\n_______________________\nJoshua Gallin\nSecretary",
+    "url": "https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20251029.pdf",
+    "action": "Lowered",
+    "rate": "3.75%-4.00%",
+    "magnitude": "0.25 percentage points",
+    "forward_guidance": "The Fed will keep the federal funds target range at 3.75%–4.00% until new data suggest a change, and will adjust the stance if risks to employment or inflation emerge.",
+    "key_economic_factors": [
+      "Moderate economic activity with job gains slowing and unemployment slightly higher but still low",
+      "Inflation remains somewhat above the 2% target, though expectations are anchored",
+      "Downside risks to employment have risen, prompting a move toward a more neutral stance",
+      "Financial conditions remain supportive, but the Fed is cautious about potential inflation persistence"
+    ],
+    "economic_outlook": "Growth is expected to stay modest, with GDP likely staying above potential through 2028 as tariffs ease and financial conditions remain a tailwind. Inflation is projected to stay above target in the near term but should gradually return to 2% as tariff effects wane and supply‑side gains from AI and productivity improvements take hold. Employment is expected to improve slowly, with the unemployment rate falling toward the natural rate but remaining slightly above it.",
+    "market_impact": "The rate cut should lower borrowing costs for businesses and consumers, potentially boosting investment and spending. However, markets will likely remain cautious, keeping an eye on inflation data and the Fed’s willingness to pause or reverse the easing if inflation risks rise."
+  },
   {
     "date": "2025-09-17",
     "title": "FOMC Meeting 2025-09-17",
@@ -7,15 +25,15 @@
     "action": "Lowered",
     "rate": "4.00%-4.25%",
     "magnitude": "0.25 percentage points",
-    "forward_guidance": "The Fed said it will keep easing further over the rest of the year if data support it, but will adjust as needed if risks change.",
+    "forward_guidance": "The Fed said it will keep easing further over the rest of the year if data support it, but will adjust as needed to keep inflation near 2% and employment high.",
     "key_economic_factors": [
-      "Moderate economic growth and slower job gains",
-      "Higher inflation that remains above target",
-      "Increased downside risk to employment",
-      "Tariff‑related inflation pressures"
+      "Moderate GDP growth and slowing job gains",
+      "Low but slightly rising unemployment",
+      "Inflation still above target but expected to fall",
+      "Tariff increases adding some price pressure"
     ],
-    "economic_outlook": "Inflation has risen but is still somewhat above the 2% goal; growth is moderate and employment remains low but with rising risks; the Fed expects inflation to fall to 2% by 2027 while GDP growth should pick up next year.",
-    "market_impact": "Lower rates should ease borrowing costs for businesses and consumers, potentially boosting spending and earnings, while markets may see modest gains; however, persistent inflation risks could temper long‑term optimism."
+    "economic_outlook": "The Fed expects the economy to grow modestly this year, with inflation above 2% but likely to decline to 2% by 2027. Employment is expected to stay near the natural rate, with a slight uptick in unemployment this year but improving in the coming years.",
+    "market_impact": "Lower rates should ease borrowing costs for businesses and consumers, supporting spending and corporate earnings, while markets may see modest gains. However, inflation risks remain, so investors should monitor price pressures closely."
   },
   {
     "date": "2025-07-30",