Daily Papers

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

LLM applications (i.e., LLM apps) leverage the powerful capabilities of LLMs to provide users with customized services, revolutionizing traditional application development. While the increasing prevalence of LLM-powered applications provides users with unprecedented convenience, it also brings forth new security challenges. For such an emerging ecosystem, the security community lacks sufficient understanding of the LLM application ecosystem, especially regarding the capability boundaries of the applications themselves. In this paper, we systematically analyzed the new development paradigm and defined the concept of the LLM app capability space. We also uncovered potential new risks beyond jailbreak that arise from ambiguous capability boundaries in real-world scenarios, namely, capability downgrade and upgrade. To evaluate the impact of these risks, we designed and implemented an LLM app capability evaluation framework, LLMApp-Eval. First, we collected application metadata across 4 platforms and conducted a cross-platform ecosystem analysis. Then, we evaluated the risks for 199 popular applications among 4 platforms and 6 open-source LLMs. We identified that 178 (89.45%) potentially affected applications, which can perform tasks from more than 15 scenarios or be malicious. We even found 17 applications in our study that executed malicious tasks directly, without applying any adversarial rewriting. Furthermore, our experiments also reveal a positive correlation between the quality of prompt design and application robustness. We found that well-designed prompts enhance security, while poorly designed ones can facilitate abuse. We hope our work inspires the community to focus on the real-world risks of LLM applications and foster the development of a more robust LLM application ecosystem.

Training and deployed inference often cross export, conversion, and platform-specific runtime boundaries. Meganeura asks whether one compact native compiler can span both phases on consumer GPUs. Its typed static graph, automatic differentiation, optimizer, checkpoint, memory planner, and runtime lower specialized programs through Vulkan and Metal. We compare five matched workloads with PyTorch on NVIDIA and AMD discrete GPUs, an AMD APU, Apple silicon, and an Intel iGPU. The protocol separates strict f32 from validated fast paths and gates forward and backward independently. Forty-eight of 50 device-workload-mode cells pass both gates; the other two share one unresolved backward-reference disagreement on a newly supported APU. In strict f32, Meganeura wins 12 of 20 GPU-referenced minimal-latency cells and has a median valid training gap of 1.8x. On the discrete AMD GPU, four of five inference workloads are within 1.10x of compiled ROCm PyTorch and three training workloads are faster. Under accelerated contracts, the worst training gap is 4.6x. Compilation takes 0.1-2.4 seconds versus 6-96 seconds for torch.compile on supported GPU paths; the stripped binary is 13 MiB. Dispatch profiles localize the largest gaps to convolution derivatives and attention backward. A physical Android XR case study transfers a Meganeura-trained decoder into an Adreno/OpenXR application sharing the graphics queue. The results show that general consumer graphics APIs can support a compact shared train-to-deploy stack at useful, sometimes vendor-competitive performance. The measured gaps point to kernel coverage, scheduling, and arithmetic policy rather than an identified API limitation.

Instruction hierarchy (IH) requires models to prioritize instructions by source, ensuring that higher-priority instructions override lower-priority ones. Despite its importance for safe and controllable deployment, existing evaluations have focused almost exclusively on English, leaving it unclear whether IH compliance remains stable in multilingual settings. We introduce XIH-Bench, a benchmark for multilingual IH evaluation with both same-language and cross-language conflicts across six languages, four domains, and three IH settings. Across models, we find two consistent patterns. First, IH compliance exhibits a clear language-dependent asymmetry: a language that strengthens compliance in the higher-priority position can become disruptive in the lower-priority position. Second, cross-language conflicts yield higher compliance than same-language conflicts, a phenomenon we term the Language Boundary Effect. We further show that language specialization can make lower-priority instructions in model-favored languages harder to override, creating multilingual reliability and security risks.

Recent advances in multimodal foundation models and agent systems have driven GUI agents from single-platform task execution toward cross-platform interaction. However, building multi-platform GUI agents remains challenging. On one hand, high-quality and executable cross-platform interaction trajectories are still scarce, and existing data often suffer from limited platform coverage. On the other hand, different platforms exhibit distinct interaction conventions, making joint or continual training prone to behavioral pattern mixing, platform-specific capability degradation, and catastrophic forgetting. To address these challenges, we construct Uni-GUI, a high-quality cross-platform GUI interaction dataset, and propose UI-MOPD, the first method that incorporates multi-teacher on-policy distillation into continual learning for GUI agents. UI-MOPD dynamically selects a platform-specific teacher according to the current environment and transfers platform-specific behavioral priors to a shared policy through platform-conditioned distillation, enabling adaptation to new platforms while preserving capabilities on existing ones. Experiments on OSWorld and MobileWorld show that UI-MOPD achieves task success rates of 38.2% and 12.0%, respectively, demonstrating its effectiveness in balancing cross-platform capability retention and new-platform adaptation. Project page: https://elispectre.github.io/UI-MOPD/.

Code benchmarks such as HumanEval are widely adopted to evaluate Large Language Models' (LLMs) coding capabilities. However, there is an unignorable programming language bias in existing code benchmarks -- over 95% code generation benchmarks are dominated by Python, leaving the LLMs' capabilities in other programming languages such as Java and C/C++ unknown. Moreover, coding task bias is also crucial. Most benchmarks focus on code generation capability, while benchmarks for code reasoning (given input, reasoning output; and given output, reasoning input), an essential coding capability, are insufficient. Yet, constructing multi-lingual benchmarks can be expensive and labor-intensive, and codes in contest websites such as Leetcode suffer from data contamination during training. To fill this gap, we propose CRUXEVAL-X, a multi-lingual code reasoning benchmark that contains 19 programming languages. It comprises at least 600 subjects for each language, along with 19K content-consistent tests in total. In particular, the construction pipeline of CRUXEVAL-X works in a fully automated and test-guided manner, which iteratively generates and repairs based on execution feedback. Also, to cross language barriers (e.g., dynamic/static type systems in Python/C++), we formulated various transition rules between language pairs to facilitate translation. Our intensive evaluation of 24 representative LLMs reveals the correlation between language pairs. For example, TypeScript and JavaScript show a significant positive correlation, while Racket has less correlation with other languages. More interestingly, even a model trained solely on Python can achieve at most 34.4% Pass@1 in other languages, revealing the cross-language generalization of LLMs.

Despite the rapid development of safety alignment techniques for LLMs, defending against multi-turn jailbreaks is still a challenging task. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive comparison, revealing that some existing defense methods can improve the robustness of LLMs against multi-turn jailbreaks but compromise usability, i.e., reducing general capabilities or causing the over-refusal problem. From the perspective of mechanism interpretability of LLMs, we discover that these methods fail to establish a boundary that exactly distinguishes safe and harmful feature representations. Therefore, boundary-safe representations close to harmful representations are inevitably disrupted, leading to a decline in usability. To address this issue, we propose X-Boundary to push harmful representations away from boundary-safe representations and obtain an exact distinction boundary. In this way, harmful representations can be precisely erased without disrupting safe ones. Experimental results show that X-Boundary achieves state-of-the-art defense performance against multi-turn jailbreaks, while reducing the over-refusal rate by about 20% and maintaining nearly complete general capability. Furthermore, we theoretically prove and empirically verify that X-Boundary can accelerate the convergence process during training. Please see our code at: https://github.com/AI45Lab/X-Boundary.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

Code completion models have made significant progress in recent years, yet current popular evaluation datasets, such as HumanEval and MBPP, predominantly focus on code completion tasks within a single file. This over-simplified setting falls short of representing the real-world software development scenario where repositories span multiple files with numerous cross-file dependencies, and accessing and understanding cross-file context is often required to complete the code correctly. To fill in this gap, we propose CrossCodeEval, a diverse and multilingual code completion benchmark that necessitates an in-depth cross-file contextual understanding to complete the code accurately. CrossCodeEval is built on a diverse set of real-world, open-sourced, permissively-licensed repositories in four popular programming languages: Python, Java, TypeScript, and C#. To create examples that strictly require cross-file context for accurate completion, we propose a straightforward yet efficient static-analysis-based approach to pinpoint the use of cross-file context within the current file. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art code language models like CodeGen and StarCoder demonstrate that CrossCodeEval is extremely challenging when the relevant cross-file context is absent, and we see clear improvements when adding these context into the prompt. However, despite such improvements, the pinnacle of performance remains notably unattained even with the highest-performing model, indicating that CrossCodeEval is also capable of assessing model's capability in leveraging extensive context to make better code completion. Finally, we benchmarked various methods in retrieving cross-file context, and show that CrossCodeEval can also be used to measure the capability of code retrievers.

Coding agents increasingly run inside organizations whose security controls (scoped credentials, restricted egress, read-only filesystems, non-root execution) constrain them like any other software. Existing benchmarks, however, evaluate agents almost exclusively in permissive sandboxes, so it is unknown how performance changes when policy is enforced. In this work, we evaluate 12 coding agents on Terminal-Bench 2.1 across nested security policy levels derived from common real-world enterprise restrictions. Hardening is never free but far from uniform: under the strictest policy, success losses reach 18.3 points and cost inflation 167.3\%, and the two axes disagree; the model that best preserves success is also the one that loses the most efficiency, so model choice is policy-dependent. Beyond aggregate scores, we characterize how agents behave when policy blocks their actions and decompose the failures hardening induces: runs grind into timeouts or wrong solutions rather than stopping early, in a mix that differs by model. To ground comparisons, we verify task solvability under the strictest policy, separating model failures from tasks the policy forecloses. We release Boundary-Bench, an open-source hardening plugin enabling policy-constrained evaluation of coding agents on Terminal-Bench and compatible benchmarks.

We explore Cross-lingual Backdoor ATtacks (X-BAT) in multilingual Large Language Models (mLLMs), revealing how backdoors inserted in one language can automatically transfer to others through shared embedding spaces. Using toxicity classification as a case study, we demonstrate that attackers can compromise multilingual systems by poisoning data in a single language, with rare tokens serving as specific effective triggers. Our findings expose a critical vulnerability in the fundamental architecture that enables cross-lingual transfer in these models. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/himanshubeniwal/X-BAT.

LLM coding agents issue Bash commands through interfaces that may serialize, wrap, and reparse model output. Matched execution scores alone cannot distinguish command-generation errors from failures introduced after generation. QuoteBench measures this boundary with exact final-state validation on 56 one-shot tasks from 14 incident-derived families, crossing the generation contract with the execution transport around one deliberately unescaped added parser. Escaping at the interpolation point reproduces each replayed reply's raw-path outcome, so any recovery under a disclosed boundary must come from the model changing its generation. Across eight same-window configurations, replaying the same reply through the added parser lowers success by 55.4 to 73.2 percentage points; disclosure recovers 30.4 to 60.7 points for six configurations, and zero or slightly negative for the other two. Raw generation is nearly saturated at the frontier; boundary adaptation is what still separates models. GPT-5.6-sol's matched gap of -3.6 points hides -64.3 points of damage and +60.7 points of compensation. The deployment configuration reorders models: one reversal among 26 comparable pairs is unambiguous and four more sit on single-task margins. Evaluations of command-issuing agents should report the model configuration, generation contract, execution path, operating point, and final-state validator rather than treat a matched score as an intrinsic model property.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

LLM-agent services repeatedly execute small deterministic transitions between model and tool calls: route an outcome, update state, and emit the next effect. We ask when this control path exposes enough concurrent work for GPU execution, and what changes when a GPU-computed route decision remains on device. We formalize the ready-cohort boundary using fixed-partition share F, exact offline share P*, local upper bound U, and online achieved share A. Under zero service time, unlimited capacity, and equal relative launch deadlines, a specialized dynamic program computes P* exactly. In a stationary Poisson replay of one pinned 851-session public trace panel, the primary condition at 100,000 target active sessions, K=256, and a 50 ms launch deadline gives F=30.19%, P*=43.00%, and U=45.85%. Exact packing recovers 81.83% of the opportunity lost at fixed window boundaries. The outcome-derived route key is a conditioning proxy, not proof of executable identity. A separate mechanism study keeps a GPU-computed binary decision on device instead of returning four bytes to the host and redispatching. Across four named GPU placements, the device-resident path is faster in all 36 configurations; within-placement row-median ratios range from 1.19x to 2.39x. Across both admissible mechanisms, all 14,557,440 tested batched invocations match a separately implemented host oracle. A fixed nested device graph that removes no host decision is slower in all 60 configurations across five placements. Together, the studies establish two measurable gates for GPU agent control: deadline-feasible cohort supply and observation placement. A joined finite online runtime is required to measure A, CPU displacement, and service-level benefit.

We present Boundary IoU (Intersection-over-Union), a new segmentation evaluation measure focused on boundary quality. We perform an extensive analysis across different error types and object sizes and show that Boundary IoU is significantly more sensitive than the standard Mask IoU measure to boundary errors for large objects and does not over-penalize errors on smaller objects. The new quality measure displays several desirable characteristics like symmetry w.r.t. prediction/ground truth pairs and balanced responsiveness across scales, which makes it more suitable for segmentation evaluation than other boundary-focused measures like Trimap IoU and F-measure. Based on Boundary IoU, we update the standard evaluation protocols for instance and panoptic segmentation tasks by proposing the Boundary AP (Average Precision) and Boundary PQ (Panoptic Quality) metrics, respectively. Our experiments show that the new evaluation metrics track boundary quality improvements that are generally overlooked by current Mask IoU-based evaluation metrics. We hope that the adoption of the new boundary-sensitive evaluation metrics will lead to rapid progress in segmentation methods that improve boundary quality.

While understanding the knowledge boundaries of LLMs is crucial to prevent hallucination, research on knowledge boundaries of LLMs has predominantly focused on English. In this work, we present the first study to analyze how LLMs recognize knowledge boundaries across different languages by probing their internal representations when processing known and unknown questions in multiple languages. Our empirical studies reveal three key findings: 1) LLMs' perceptions of knowledge boundaries are encoded in the middle to middle-upper layers across different languages. 2) Language differences in knowledge boundary perception follow a linear structure, which motivates our proposal of a training-free alignment method that effectively transfers knowledge boundary perception ability across languages, thereby helping reduce hallucination risk in low-resource languages; 3) Fine-tuning on bilingual question pair translation further enhances LLMs' recognition of knowledge boundaries across languages. Given the absence of standard testbeds for cross-lingual knowledge boundary analysis, we construct a multilingual evaluation suite comprising three representative types of knowledge boundary data. Our code and datasets are publicly available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/LLM-Multilingual-Knowledge-Boundaries.

Explicit graphics APIs expose memory dependencies, per-resource accesses, and image layouts. wgpu reconstructs and validates this state; Blade keeps Vulkan images in GENERAL, tracks no per-resource state, and issues global pass-boundary barriers. We isolate barrier placement and stage/access scope within Blade, compare matched wgpu programs end-to-end, and measure six GPUs from four vendors, including exploratory Apple/Metal results. Removing fifteen redundant barriers from sixteen independent compute passes reduces GPU span by 29.3% on an RTX 5070 and 32.3% on an RX 7900 XT. It reduces independent-render span by 32.4% and 7.3% on the same discrete parts, but increases Radeon 780M span by 42.4% at 32 passes, beyond a 12.3% count-specific stability floor. No dependent-chain placement effect clears the study's cell-specific stability criterion. Deriving global barrier scope from the pass kinds around each boundary, without tracking any resource, saves 5.0% on an NVIDIA graphics chain and 6.7% on an AMD compute chain; no AMD render-involving scope cell resolves. wgpu's record-and-submit cost is higher in every measured cell, but this end-to-end difference cannot be attributed to tracking alone. RADV source shows why command counts do not predict these costs: broad global dependencies expand to several flush and invalidate requests that the driver may partly elide. It also shows that persistent GENERAL retains DCC under the measured RDNA conditions but disables FMASK. The resulting Blade direction is lightweight aggregate pass-kind state in a tracking-free RHI: an upstream render graph selects global dependency cuts, while aliasing, cross-queue use, exceptional layouts, and arbitrary per-resource DAG edges remain resource-aware engine responsibilities.