Daily Papers

In vibe coding, people describe software in natural language and delegate implementation to AI agents. By analogy, vibe commerce allows people to express buying or selling goals in natural language and delegate the corresponding tasks to agents. Commerce, however, requires independently controlled Buyer and Merchant agents to interact in a shared market while preserving their private objectives and distinct authority. We introduce Agentic Commerce World (ACWorld), an environment for evaluating such agents across ongoing transactions. Through its Vibe Commerce Protocol (VCP), ACWorld validates agent actions before updating shared transaction state and records the resulting interactions, making agent behavior auditable and evaluation reproducible. The ACWorld Benchmark contains a 200-task capability-coverage track and a 60-task large-catalog track that searches 785,022 transactable listings. Across ten models, mean scores range from 65.9% to 85.6% and from 56.1% to 91.4%, respectively. Our analysis shows that process-level evidence is necessary: final state alone can miss evaluated errors, incomplete trajectories still retain useful process signals, and large-catalog tasks expose bottlenecks across stages.

Security is an essential cornerstone of functioning digital marketplaces and communities. If users doubt that data shared online will remain secure, they will withdraw from platforms. Even when firms take these risks seriously, security expertise is expensive and vulnerabilities are diverse in nature. Increasingly, firms and governments are turning to bug bounty programs (BBPs) to crowdsource their cybersecurity, in which they pay individuals for reporting vulnerabilities in their systems. And while the use of BBPs has grown significantly in recent years, research on the actors in this market and their incentives remains limited. Using the lens of transaction cost economics, this paper examines the incentives of firms and researchers (sometimes called hackers) participating in BBPs. We study the crucial role that centralized platforms that organize BBPs play in this emerging market. We carry out an analysis of the HackerOne BBP platform, using a novel dataset on over 14,000 researchers reporting over 125,000 public vulnerabilities to over 500 firms from 2014 to the end of 2021. We outline how platforms like HackerOne make a market for information security vulnerabilities by reducing information asymmetries and their associated transaction costs.

The rapidly evolving labor market, driven by technological advancements and economic shifts, presents significant challenges for traditional job matching and consultation services. In response, we introduce an advanced support tool for career counselors and job seekers based on CareerBERT, a novel approach that leverages the power of unstructured textual data sources, such as resumes, to provide more accurate and comprehensive job recommendations. In contrast to previous approaches that primarily focus on job recommendations based on a fixed set of concrete job advertisements, our approach involves the creation of a corpus that combines data from the European Skills, Competences, and Occupations (ESCO) taxonomy and EURopean Employment Services (EURES) job advertisements, ensuring an up-to-date and well-defined representation of general job titles in the labor market. Our two-step evaluation approach, consisting of an application-grounded evaluation using EURES job advertisements and a human-grounded evaluation using real-world resumes and Human Resources (HR) expert feedback, provides a comprehensive assessment of CareerBERT's performance. Our experimental results demonstrate that CareerBERT outperforms both traditional and state-of-the-art embedding approaches while showing robust effectiveness in human expert evaluations. These results confirm the effectiveness of CareerBERT in supporting career consultants by generating relevant job recommendations based on resumes, ultimately enhancing the efficiency of job consultations and expanding the perspectives of job seekers. This research contributes to the field of NLP and job recommendation systems, offering valuable insights for both researchers and practitioners in the domain of career consulting and job matching.

Prediction markets are designed to aggregate dispersed information about future events, yet today's ecosystem is fragmented across heterogeneous operator-run platforms and blockchain-based protocols that independently list economically identical events. In the absence of a shared notion of event identity, liquidity fails to pool across venues, arbitrage becomes capital-intensive or unenforceable, and prices systematically violate the Law of One Price. As a result, market prices reflect platform-local beliefs rather than a single, globally aggregated probability, undermining the core information-aggregation function of prediction markets. We address this gap by introducing a semantic alignment framework that makes cross-platform event identity explicit through joint analysis of natural-language descriptions, resolution semantics, and temporal scope. Applying this framework, we construct the first human-validated, cross-platform dataset of aligned prediction markets, covering over 100 000 events across ten major venues from 2018 to 2025. Using this dataset, we show that roughly 6% of all events are concurrently listed across platforms and that semantically equivalent markets exhibit persistent execution-aware price deviations of 2-4% on average, even in highly liquid and information-rich settings. These mispricings give rise to persistent cross-platform arbitrage opportunities driven by structural frictions rather than informational disagreement. Overall, our results demonstrate that semantic non-fungibility is a fundamental barrier to price convergence, and that resolving event identity is a prerequisite for prediction markets to aggregate information at a global scale.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

This paper develops a three-currency Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework in which corporate credit is treated as a separate economy, connected to the nominal and real economies through synthetic inflation and credit exchange rates. The framework produces a testable identity. Under joint no-arbitrage, the credit spread of an issuer expressed over the inflation-rateindexed risk-free curve equals the same issuer's credit spread expressed over the nominalrate-indexed risk-free curve plus the model-implied breakeven inflation forward at the same maturity. The identity holds within any single calibration of the framework. It is empirically falsifiable across two parallel corporate-bond segments of the same market, in a segmented market the two segments may price different corporate credit economies, and the gap between their implied corporate forwards measures the failure of the shared-credit-economy assumption. Applied to Brazilian debenture markets, the framework delivers a sharp empirical finding. Fifteen large issuers placed paper in both the CDI-indexed general-purpose segment and the IPCA-indexed infrastructure segment between January 2021 and February 2026. The within-issuer triangle residual at the 3-year tenor averages 640 basis points, with crosssectional standard deviation of 26 basis points across the 15 issuer means, and remains stable through both the 2021-2023 BCB tightening cycle and the 2024-2026 easing phase. A retail post-tax indifference benchmark anchored on Lei 12.431 closes the bulk of the residual. The remainder is consistent with institutional participation on the CDI side, contractual asymmetries between debentures with different use-of-proceeds restrictions, and segment-specific liquidity gaps.

We present a convolutional variational autoencoder for cryptocurrency implied-volatility surfaces, together with a deployable predictor that combines it with a quadratic smile re-fit through a deterministic per-tenor routing rule. Trained on 6,034 fully-filled hourly Binance Options surfaces of BTC and ETH spanning May-October 2023 and parameterised on a common 6 times 7 tenor-delta grid, the model attains a hidden-cell surface-completion RMSE in the 0.94-1.56 vol-point range across both markets and mask rates 10-50%. The hybrid predictor attains 0.83 vol points at 50% masking against 7.00 for the smile re-fit alone, an eightfold reduction obtained at no additional inference cost. Under structurally-correlated hole patterns that emulate the withdrawal of an entire tenor of strikes, the smile re-fit incurs 9.6-13.1 vol points of error while the learned model remains at 1.5-1.9, isolating a regime in which the generative model is the only viable predictor. Joint training on BTC and ETH improves the in-distribution model on both markets by 9-27% relative to the better-performing single-symbol counterpart, indicating a substantially shared vol-surface manifold across the two largest cryptocurrencies over the observation window. The hybrid is calendar- and butterfly-arbitrage-free at the listed strikes, a property that the parametric smile re-fit alone fails at high mask rates. The per-snapshot reconstruction error of the trained model flags the late-October ETF-anticipation rally and the August 17, 2023 flash crash as elevated-error periods without supervision. All training and evaluation infrastructure is released to support reproducible follow-on work.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

Autonomous AI agents now transact at production scale -- 69,000 bots executing 165 million transactions across 50 million USDC in cumulative volume on a single marketplace -- without any shared trust layer between participants. Regulatory frameworks (Singapore IMDA, NIST CAISI, EU AI Act) and major AI laboratories (Anthropic, Google) have independently converged on the same structural requirement: an open, portable, cryptographically verifiable trust infrastructure for autonomous agents that no single vendor can deliver alone. This paper presents MolTrust, a production-deployed implementation of such an infrastructure built on W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0 and Decentralized Identifiers v1.0, with on-chain anchoring on Base Layer 2. The system architecture is organized around four primitives (identity, authorization, behavioral record, portability), a five-party accountability chain, and the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE) -- a machine-evaluable authorization structure enforced at three layers: cryptographic signatures, API-level credential lifecycle management, and kernel-level syscall monitoring via Falco eBPF integration. The paper documents three distinguishing capabilities: kernel-layer AAE enforcement below the agent process boundary; cross-protocol interoperability through five reproducible test vectors verified against independent implementations; and layered Sybil resistance combining dual-signature interaction proofs, cross-vertical endorsement diversity gating, and principal-DID-linked violation persistence. The reference implementation has been operational since March 2026 across eight credential verticals. Empirical validation at adversarial scale is pending. The contribution is deployment-first evidence that the trust infrastructure regulators and industry have converged on is implementable today using W3C-standardized primitives.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

Rolling-window factor pipelines for Chinese A-share markets contain a subtle but costly flaw: daily price-move limits (+/-10% main-board, +/-20% STAR/ChiNext) render a fraction of closing prices non-executable, yet standard implementations ingest these values before any row-filtering runs. The contaminated aggregates propagate silently through moving averages, correlations, and ranks--a failure mode we term "upstream contamination". On real A-share data it inflates apparent information coefficient by 18% while reducing realised Sharpe by 0.44 points, because the model learns to predict returns it cannot trade. We resolve this with a mask-first design: a Boolean tradability mask is constructed at data load time and threaded through every operator, so that no window ever reads a non-tradable price. Built on this foundation, the system adds (i) a GPU-vectorised 213-factor engine via PyTorch unfold primitives (51x over pandas); (ii) an Adjusted-MSE loss penalising wrong-sign predictions 11x more heavily than magnitude errors; (iii) block-bootstrap GBM augmentation; and (iv) Markowitz-Ledoit-Wolf portfolio optimisation with cvxpy warm-start caching. On a calibrated 3,000-stock synthetic panel the system achieves annualised Sharpe 2.05; on proprietary real A-share data (2022-2024) it achieves Sharpe 1.63. Ablation shows the mask contract is the single largest contributor (+0.44), exceeding any model or loss choice. The full implementation is released under MIT licence at https://github.com/initial-d/ml-quant-trading.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

Combating disinformation is one of the burning societal crises -- about 67% of the American population believes that disinformation produces a lot of uncertainty, and 10% of them knowingly propagate disinformation. Evidence shows that disinformation can manipulate democratic processes and public opinion, causing disruption in the share market, panic and anxiety in society, and even death during crises. Therefore, disinformation should be identified promptly and, if possible, mitigated. With approximately 3.2 billion images and 720,000 hours of video shared online daily on social media platforms, scalable detection of multimodal disinformation requires efficient fact verification. Despite progress in automatic text-based fact verification (e.g., FEVER, LIAR), the research community lacks substantial effort in multimodal fact verification. To address this gap, we introduce FACTIFY 3M, a dataset of 3 million samples that pushes the boundaries of the domain of fact verification via a multimodal fake news dataset, in addition to offering explainability through the concept of 5W question-answering. Salient features of the dataset include: (i) textual claims, (ii) ChatGPT-generated paraphrased claims, (iii) associated images, (iv) stable diffusion-generated additional images (i.e., visual paraphrases), (v) pixel-level image heatmap to foster image-text explainability of the claim, (vi) 5W QA pairs, and (vii) adversarial fake news stories.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Although synthetic data is widely promoted as a remedy, its prevailing production paradigm -- one optimizing for statistical smoothness -- systematically removes the long-tail, cognitively grounded irregularities that characterize human text. Prolonged training on such statistically optimal but cognitively impoverished data accelerates model collapse. This paper proposes a paradigm shift: instead of imitating the surface properties of data, we simulate the cognitive processes that generate human text. We introduce the Prompt-driven Cognitive Computing Framework (PMCSF), whose core consists of a Cognitive State Decoder (CSD) that reverse-engineers unstructured text into structured cognitive vectors, and a Cognitive Text Encoder (CTE) that re-materializes these states into text enriched with human-typical imperfections via mathematically defined Cognitive Perturbation Operators. The framework is validated through a two-stage objective evaluation pipeline. First, in cognitive codec verification, CTE text yields a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.0614 from human text (vs. 0.4431 for standard LLM output), passes double-blind professional media review, and achieves an intraclass correlation coefficient ICC > 0.9 for cognitive profile alignment across heterogeneous models. Second, in functional gain evaluation, isomorphic stress tests in the A-share market show that strategies incorporating CTE-generated data reduce maximum drawdown by 47.4% during the 2015 crash and deliver 8.6% Defensive Alpha, exceeding transaction costs by a factor of 33. Our findings demonstrate that modelling human cognitive limitations -- not copying surface data -- enables synthetic data with genuine functional gain, offering a viable technical pathway toward resolving the AI data-collapse crisis.

Based on principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory, companies use the method of increasing executives' shareholding to stimulate collaborative innovation. However, from the aspect of agency costs between management and shareholders (i.e. the first type) and between major shareholders and minority shareholders (i.e. the second type), the interests of management, shareholders and creditors will be unbalanced with the change of the marginal utility of executive equity incentives.In order to establish the correlation between the proportion of shares held by executives and investments in corporate innovation, we have chosen a range of publicly listed companies within China's A-share market as the focus of our study. Employing a multi-variable linear regression model, we aim to analyze this relationship thoroughly.The following models were developed: (1) the impact model of executive shareholding on corporate innovation investment; (2) the impact model of executive shareholding on two types of agency costs; (3)The model is employed to examine the mediating influence of the two categories of agency costs. Following both correlation and regression analyses, the findings confirm a meaningful and positive correlation between executives' shareholding and the augmentation of corporate innovation investments. Additionally, the results indicate that executive shareholding contributes to the reduction of the first type of agency cost, thereby fostering corporate innovation investment. However, simultaneously, it leads to an escalation in the second type of agency cost, thus impeding corporate innovation investment.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

We seek to identify the most relevant benefits offered by Medicare Advantage Health Plans that drive membership and market share. As an example, we explore plans operating in a single county in New Jersey between 2018 and 2023. A dataset of benefits from publicly available data sources was created and the variance inflation factor was applied to identify the correlation between the extracted features, to avoid multicollinearity and overparameterization problems. We categorized the variable Market Share and used it as a multinomial response variable with three categories: less than 0.3\%, 0.3\% to 1.5\%, and over 1.5\%. Categories were chosen to achieve approximately uniform distribution of plans (47, 60, and 65 respectively). We built a multinomial Lasso model using 5-fold cross-validation to tune the penalty parameter. Lasso forced some features to be dropped from the model, which reduces the risk of overfitting and increases the interpretability of the results. For each category, important variables are different. Certain brands drive market share, as do PPO plans and prescription drug coverage. Benefits, particularly ancillary benefits that are not part of CMS's required benefits, appear to have little influence, while financial terms such as deductibles, copays, and out-of-pocket limits are associated with higher market share. Finally, we evaluated the predictive accuracy of the Lasso model with the test set. The accuracy is 0.76.